BYU Law Review
Volume 1977 | Issue 2

Article 10

5-1-1977

Mineral Law-Surface Conflicts-Mineral Lessee
Held Liable for Depreciated Value of Land Under
"Growing Crops" Lease Provision-Fly ing Diamond
Corp. v. Rust

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mineral Law-Surface Conflicts-Mineral Lessee Held Liable for Depreciated Value of Land Under "Growing Crops" Lease Provision-Fly ing
Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 1977 BYU L. Rev. 524 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1977/iss2/10

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Mineral Law-SURFACECONFLICTS-MINERAL
LESSEEHELDLIADEPRECIATED
VALUEOF LANDUNDER"GROWING
CROPS"
LEASEP R O V I S I O NDiamond
- F ~ ~ ~Corp.
~ ~ v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509
(Utah 1976).

BLE FOR

Flying Diamond Corporation (Flying Diamond) held a lease
for the oil and gas rights on the property of Anthon Rust.' Flying
Diamond attempted to commence development of the minerals2
on Rust's property by constructing an access road and an oil and
gas well site. With the aid of the sheriff, Rust prohibited the
operations and ordered Flying Diamond from the p r ~ p e r t y . ~
Thereafter Flying Diamond brought an action against Rust,
seeking a preliminary injunction to restrain Rust from further
interference with the mineral development, an order to show
cause as to why a permanent injunction should not be issued, and
damages .'
The temporary injunction was issued, whereupon Flying Diamond proceeded with the construction. Rust then brought a counterclaim for damages, alleging trespass, a taking by eminent
domain,5 and unreasonable and excessive use of the surface by
Flying D i a r n ~ n d .The
~ trial court dismissed Flying Diamond's
1. Rust's estate was actually held jointly with his wife. Both Flying Diamond and the
Rusts obtained their severed interests from third parties. Brief of Appellant a t 1-2, Flying
Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976).
2. The word "minerals" in an instrument includes gas and oil. Patterson v. Wilcox,
11 Utah 2d 264, 265 n.2, 358 P.2d 88, 89 n.2 (1961); Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d
112, 114-15, 288 P.2d 452, 453-54 (1955).
3. Trial Record at 14, 16.
4. Flying Diamond sought damages of $1000 for defendant's initial interference with
operations and $2,500 per day for each day it was prohibited from entering the property.
Plaintiffs Complaint.
5. Rust's third cause of action and prayer stated:
In the event that the Court shall not award the defendants the foregoing
relief, defendants pray that they be awarded reasonable compensation for the
taking of their property under the Eminent Domain Statutes of the State of
Utah in sum of $61,000.00, together with punitive damages in the sum of
$30,000.00.
Defendant's Answer & Counterclaim. Rust's claim for compensation for the use of the
surface by the mineral owner, alleged to be a taking under Utah's eminent domain statutes, may have contributed to the confusion concerning the rights of the parties. Utah is
one of the few states to designate mining as a use for which property may be taken under
eminent domain powers. See UTAHCODEANN.§ 78-34-1 (Supp. 1975);Ferguson, Severed
Surface and Mineral Estates-Right to Use, Damage or Destroy the Surface to Recover
Minerals, 19 ROCKYMTN.MIN. L. INST.411, 431 (1974). The courts may have felt that
the mineral owner should pay for any surface used as required in eminent domain. Eminent domain is, however, inapplicable when a party already has the right to use the
surface.
6. Rust also claimed $30,000.00 in punitive damages, alleging that Flying Diamond
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complaint, holding that the surface owner was entitled to two
awards of damages. First, Rust was entitled to compensation
based on a "growing crops" lease provision for the reasonable
value of 5.88 acres of property taken in construction of the access
road and well site.' Second, Rust was entitled to compensation
for the depreciated value of 15 acres, the irrigation of which had
been disrupted by the placement of Flying Diamond's access
road? The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower

A. Dominance of the Mineral Estate
Mineral and surface estates may become separated" in various ways;" oil and gas rights, however, are usually severed from
the fee by a lease between the mineral lessee and the holder of
the fee estate. The lease form may vary considerably but usually
acted maliciously and with a wanton disregard of his rights.
7. Memorandum Decision Civil No. 5035, District Court of Duchesne County, 4:
Defendant is entitled to compensation for the reasonable value of the 5.88
acres of land taken for the well site and road, under paragraph 10 of the lease
dated April 6, 1964. The Court believes that the lands taken had thereon growing crops at the time within the meaning of that term in the lease, and that the
lessee agreed in the lease to pay the lessor damages thereto. The use of the land
taken by plaintiff for the well site and the road is effectively and permanently
denied to the surface owner for any use theretofore made of the land, and the
Court holds that such damage is the fair market value of the land a t the time it
was taken which is determined to be the sum of $900.00 per acre, totaling
$5,292.00.
8. The trial court stated:
1. The location of the road where it was located was not reasonably necessary, and unreasonably interferes with the surface owners' preexisting use of the
surface making it virtually impossible for him to irrigate a portion of his land.
2. Such unreasonable interference depreciated the value of approximately
15 acres of defendants' surface rights in the amount of $750.00 per acre, totaling
$11,250.00.
Memorandum Decision Civil No. 5035, District Court of Duchesne County, 77 1-2.
9. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976).
10. Ownership of the mineral rights separate from the fee estate is not a recent
concept. See Ferguson, supra note 5. Under common law the "royal mines," those containing gold and silver, belonged exclusively to the crown despite the surface ownership resting
in a subject. 1 C. LINDLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE AMEMCAN
LAWRELATING TO MINESAND
MINERAL
LANDS§ 3, at 7-9 (3d ed. 1914). As early as 1900 Utah recognized that the
minerals could be held by someone other than the surface owner. Smith v. Jones, 21 Utah
270, 278, 60 P. 1104, 1106 (1900).
11. The mineral estate may be severed from the fee estate by a federal mineral
reservation, a state mineral reservation, or a private mineral grant or reservation. See
Fleck, Severed Mineral Interests, 51 N.D. L. REV.
369 (1974).
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grants the lessee the right to explore and develop the oil and gas
on the subject property for a specified time. If at the end of the
specified time period either gas or oil is still being commercially
produced, the lessee may continue operations until the minerals
are exhausted. Of course, the lessor will continue to receive royalty payments for as long as the minerals are produced.12
The estates of the lessee and lessor under oil and gas leases
have been consistently characterized respectively as the dominant and servient estates.13The lessee has an implied grant, absent an express provision for payment, to use so much of the
leased premises as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease without an obligation to pay for damages.14
Because the oil and gas lease grants extensive rights to the lessee,
it has even been regarded as a grant of the land itself.15
The dominance of the leasehold estate is based on the concept that "when a thing is granted, all the means to obtain it and
all the fruits and effects of it are also granted? Pursuant to
these rights the lessee has been allowed to locate his wells where
he desires," to build roads to the drill site,18to construct and use
storage and processing facilities for the oil and gas, l9 to dig ditches
for the removal of wastes,20and to use fresh and salt water from
the premises in secondary recovery operation^,^' all without legal
liability for damages to the servient surface estate.22
12. See, e.g., 6 W. SUMMERS,
THE LAWOF OIL AND GAS § 1160 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976); Davis, Selected Problems Regarding
Lessee's Rights and Obligations to the Surface Owner, 18 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST.315,
316 (1963).
14. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886,511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); Dunn
v. Southwest Ardmore Tulip Creek Sand Unit, 548 P.2d 685 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Sun
Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Texaco, Inc. v. Spires, 435 S.W.2d 550
(Tex. Ct. App. 1968).
15. Gray, A New Appraisal of the Rights of Lessees Under Oil and Gas Leases to Use
and Occupy the Surface, 20 ROCKYMTN.MIN. L. INST.227, 256-57 (1975).
16. 4 W. SUMMERS,
THE LAWOF OIL AND GAS§ 652 (1958).
17. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 137 Tex. 59,82,152 S.W.2d 711,724 (1941);
see Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 334 S.W.2d 449, 456 (Tex. Ct. App.
1960); Stephenson v. Glass, 276 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Ct. App. 1925); Grimes v. Goodman
Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Ct. App. 1919) (finding the erection of an oil derrick on
the same lot as a residential house, the placement of a slush pit next to the house, and
the operation of the well so as to splash oil on one side of the house all to be reasonable).
18. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958); Adkins v.
United Fuel Gas Co. 134 W. Va. 719, 61 S.E.2d 633 (1950).
19. See Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 73 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955).
20. See Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 719, 61 S.E.2d 633 (1950).
21. See Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1973); Sun Oil
Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972).
22. See Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEX.
L. REV.
1, 3 (1956).
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B. Restraints on the Mineral Estate
The mineral lessee's broad rights, however, are subject to the
restraints of contract and tort liability.23
1. Liability in Tort

The courts have imposed a duty upon the mineral lessee to
use only so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary, having
due regard for the rights of the surface owner, to effectuate the
purpose of the lease.14Damages for breach of this duty have been
upheld on a variety of tort theories.15For example, damages have
been awarded in nuisance where an oil and gas lessee failed to
restore the surface of the land after abandoning a well site; such
failure amounts to a taking of more surface than is reasonably
necessary and therefore creates liability for the cost of clean up.16
Negligence has been a basis for damages where the lessee conducted operations during a wet period, resulting in substantial
injury to the surface? Unreasonable location of a drill site has
been recognized as a ground of recovery where the lessee constructed a well site upon the very location that the surface owner
had selected for the building of his retirement home.18 Courts
have allowed recoveries under a broad range of findings that the
surface use or injury was not reasonably necessary or that the
mineral lessee did not exercise his rights with due regard to the
surface owner's rights.29
23. Scott, Oil and Gas Lease Clauses Relating to Surface Damage and Use of the
Surface, 13 ROCKYMTN.
MIN.L. INST. 317, 317 (1967).
24. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); Blue
v. Charles F. Hayes & Assoc., 215 So. 2d 426 (Miss. 1968); Dunn v. Southwest Ardmore
Tulip Creek Sand Unit, 548 P.2d 685 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483
S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Macha v. Crouch, 500 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); Comment, Concurrent Right to Surface Use in Conjunction with Oil and Gas Development in
Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV. 655, 656 (1973).
25. See Keeton & Jones, supra note 22.
26. E.g., Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1973).
27. E.g., Illinois Basin Oil Ass'n. v. Lynn, 425 S.W.2d 555 (Ky. 1968); see 4 W.
SUMMERS,
supra note 16, § 652.
28. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974). But
see Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Ct. App. 1919).
29. The courts have awarded damages to the surface owner upon a finding that the
mineral developer made unreasonable use of the surface in connection with waterflooding; disposal of wastes; exploratory operations on adjacent tracts; seismographic
tests; location, construction, and maintenance of well sites, slush pits, ditches, storage
tanks, reservoirs, pickup stations, buildings, pipelines, and roads; and the use of the
surface for shutdown and removal operations. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 16 (1973). These
recoveries, based on a finding of unreasonable use, are indistinguishable from awards
made upon conventional negligence, nuisance, and trespass theories, since these conventional torts are in fact based upon findings of unreasonable use of the surface.
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2. Liability in Contract

An oil and gas lease is a contract, and as such determines the
respective rights of the parties.30The parties to the lease frequently include a clause requiring the lessee to pay for any damage caused to specific items such as land, livestock, growing
crops, or improvement^.^^ Liability under such a contract arises
upon the terms of the contract and is not dependent upon any
proof of tort." The lessee agrees to pay the surface owner for
injuries to his property "independent of breach of contract or
liability for tort."" Therefore, if the item is identified in the lease,
damages may be awarded. Problems of recovery under a lease
clause do arise, however, in determining what items are included
within the definition of a particular term.
The term "growing crops" in a mineral lease has frequently
been the subject of litigation. It is generally agreed that growing
crops includes wheat, corn, alfalfa, and other products of the soil
that are raised and gathered annually.34The jurisdictions differ,
however, when considering natural products of the soil such as
range and native grasses. The Utah Supreme Court has held that
natural products of the soil are growing crops within the provisions of an oil and gas lease;35other courts have concluded that
natural products of the soil such as native grasses on uncultivated
lands used for cattle grazing are not crops under a mineral lease.36
Courts have consistently held that the use of a growing crops
clause in a mineral lease cannot justify an award of damages for
injury to land as contrasted with injury to crops growing on the
30. Dilworth v. Fortier, 405 P.2d 38, 50 (Okla. 1964); see Fast v. Kahan, 206 Kan.
682, 481 P.2d 958 (1971).
31. For example: "Lessee shall be liable and agrees to pay for all damages to the land,
livestock, growing crops, or improvements caused by lessee's operations on said lands."
Frankfort Oil Co. v. Abrams, 159 Colo. 535, 539, 413 P.2d 190, 192 (1966) (state granted
lease).
32. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Grucholski, 376 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Ct. App.
1964); Primier Petroleum Co. v. Box, 255 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953), aff'd per
curium, 152 Tex. 321, 257 S.W.2d 105 (1953).
33. Meyer v. Cox, 252 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952). The statement by the
court that liability arises independent of breach of contract is intended to be used in a
very narrow sense. If the mineral owner refuses to pay for damages as required under the
contract, the surface owner will sue on breach of contract. What is meant by liability
independent of contract, however, is that liability for damages as provided for in the lease
arises before any breach of contract occurs.
34. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 13, at 340-43 (defining the term "crops").
35. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976); Francis v. Roberts, 73
Utah 98, 272 P. 633 (1928).
36. Wohlford v. American Gas Prod. Co., 218 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1955); Union Producing Co. v. Allen, 297 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. Ct. App. 1957) (dictum).
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land. In the recent decision of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Morris,37
the Texas court of appeals considered an oil and gas lease provision that required payment by the lessee for any injury to crops.38
The lessee had used 4.23 acres of surface for the location of a well
site and access road. After the lessee ceased operations, the surface owner attempted to produce crops on the abandoned surface.
Because of the lessee's prior operations, however, the soil was
unproductive and the crops failed. The surface owner brought an
action against the lessee for damage to his crops, claiming that
the lessee was contractually liable for the damage by reason of the
lease provision under which the lessee agreed "to pay for the
damage to crops."3BAlthough the appellate court recognized that
damage to the fertility of the soil resulted in injury to future
it held that "lessee was not liable to lessors for the loss of
anticipated future crops occasioned by damage to the soil" under
the lease agreement and, therefore, the award for injury to the
fertility of the soil was in error.41Other courts considering the
question have similarly concluded that a damage-to-crops clause
in a lease is not a basis for an award for injury to the land or future
crops.42
One exception to the general rule discussed above arises
when the damaged crops are trees. In these cases damages are
determined by the use of the "depreciation in value" method. For
, ~ ~court alexample, in Cities Service Gas Co. v. C h r i ~ t i a nthe
lowed damages equal to the decreased value of the land when the
lessee's operations destroyed pecan trees growing on the land.44
37. 518 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
38. The applicable lease contained the following clause: "The Lessee agrees to pay
for damages to crops or improvements caused by operations of Lessee." Id. a t 445.
39. Id. a t 444.
40. The Texas court of appeals explained the relationship in these terms: "Texas
courts have made a clear distinction between damage to crops and damage to the fertility
of the soil, which in turn, results in a failure to produce or a reduction in production of
future crops." Id. at 446.
41. Id.
42. See Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. Ct. App. 1958)
(award for crop damage upheld but award for injury to land reversed); cf. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Hill, 57 So. 2d 162 (Miss. 1952) (pipeline easement clause
allowing payment for damages to fences, improvements, growing crops, and timber did
not include payment for destruction of top soil where it was necessary to remove or destroy
the same in the proper laying of a pipeline); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Baccus, 11 S.W.2d 355
(Tex. Ct. App. 1928) (arbitration award based on pipeline easement contract providing
payment for damage to crops or fences in error if award includes injury sustained to land).
43. 340 P.2d 929 (Okla. 1959).
44. "The rule for measuring damages arising from injury or loss of trees is the value
of the premises upon which the trees grew immediately prior to the destruction and the
value immediately thereafter." Id. a t 937 (citations omitted).
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The court made clear, however, that it applied this rule only to
trees.45As to the other crops destroyed (grasses), the court allowed no recovery for future crops or for injury to productivity of
the soil,46and approved the procedure employed by the trial court
wherein the award was based on expert testimony as to the actual
value of the crops as they stood.47

The trial court in the instant case based the award for the
5.88 acres taken for the road and drill site upon the growing crops
lease provision that provided that the lessee would "pay for damage directly and immediately caused by its operations to growing
crops theretofore planted on said land."48The supreme court affirmed this award, but did not address the major issue raised by
the appellant of whether the award was proper under the growing
crops clause." Instead, the supreme court erroneously perceived
the trial court's award of the value of the 5.88 acres to be based
on a finding that the use of the land by the mineral lessee was
unreasonable50and upheld the award on that ground.
The supreme court also upheld the award for the diminished
value of the 15 acres of irrigated land resulting from placement
of the access road. Here, however, the court pointed to the growing crops clause of the lease as if it were the basis for the trial
court's second award,51although the trial court had based its
award for the 15 acres on a finding that the access road had been
unreasonably placed.52The supreme court found that clover, al45. Id.
46. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed a disallowance by the trial court of
"[dlamages resulting from loss of future crops through land . . . being rendered nonproductive for a number of years . . . ." Id. at 933.
47. Id. a t 936-38.
48. 551 P.2d at 511.
49. See Brief of Appellant at 12-20.
50. The trial court expressly stated:
There is not sufficient evidence from which the court can find, with regard
to the amount of land taken, that the 5.88 acres of surface "taken" for the well
site and the road was in excess of that reasonably necessary, or that use of such
amount by plaintiff is unreasonable to accomplish the purposes contemplated
by the lease.
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 7 7?-at 3.
51. 551 P.2d at 511-12. The court referred to the growing crops provision as if Flying
Diamond had contended it was incorrectly used in relation to the 15 acres. Flying Diamond's references were entirely made, however, in respect to the award for the 5.88 acres.
See Brief of Appellant a t 12-20.
52. See note 8 supra.
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falfa, and natural grasses on defendant's land were crops within
the meaning of the growing crops clause and that the trial court
was justified in including the value of future crops in computing
damages for the 15 acres injured by unreasonable placement of
the roadway.53

The instant case significantly extends the rights of surface
owners; it appears to be the first instance allowing a surface
owner to recover for the depreciated value of his land under a
growing crops damage clause despite a finding that the mineral
lessee's use was reasonable. This case note will first show that
neither the trial court's award in respect to the 5.88 acres used
as an access road and drill site nor the supreme court's affirmation in respect to the 15 acres of irrigated land were properly made
under the growing crops damage clause of the lease. The case note
will then examine the possibility that the awards could have been
granted in tort.
A. Liability Under the Lease Provision for Damage to Growing
Crops
If a court were to extend a growing crops lease provision to
allow recovery for future crops, damages could be accurately measured by the decrease in present value of the land for agricultural
production. The supreme court in the instant case evidently
adopted this approach and allowed damages for future crops in
the amount of the diminished present value of the land for agricultural purposes. This holding, however, is inconsistent with the
treatment given this issue by other courts that have interpreted
similar clauses. The uniform response of the courts is exemplified
by Phillips, where the court disallowed an award for injury to the
fertility of soil under a growing crops clause.
The Phillips holding is clearly preferable. The term "growing
crops implies that it applies only to crops growing on the land at
the time of injury. Most courts have interpreted this language
literally and have concluded that the lessee under such a clause
is liable only for actual damages to growing crops resulting from
development operations and not for injury to the land.54This
interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the lessor has the
53. 551 P.2d at 511-12.
54. See notes 34-47 and accompanying text supra.
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option of requiring that the lessee be liable for damage to land,
making an award for the decrease in value appr~priate.'~
If the
lessor fails to require a provision for payment for injury to land,
the growing crops clause can hardly be stretched to achieve that
result.
Moreover, the language of the lease in the instant case stated
t h a t the lessee would pay for damage to growing crops
"therefore planted on said land."56 The addition of the word
theretofore demonstrates that the parties to the lease did not
intend that the lessee be liable for crops that might later be grown
on the land.
Although the respondent cited Cities Service in support of
the trial court's award of the entire depreciated value of the 5.88
acres," a close reading of t h a t case indicates that the
depreciation-in-value rule was applied only when the "crops"
were trees.58As to the other growing crops such as grasses, the
Cities Service court allowed damages only for the actual value of
the crops as they stood. Since the respondent in the instant case
did not claim damage to trees, the court could not have properly
relied upon Cities Service to award an amount equal to the diminished value of the land.
Consequently, based upon the clear meaning of the growing
crops clause and the weight of authority holding that such a
clause requires payment for the value of the crop as injured but
not for any injury to the future productivity of the land, neither
the supreme court's award for the depreciated value of the 15
acres that resulted from location of the access road nor the trial
court's award for the value of the 5.88 acres used as a well site
and access road can be upheld under the growing crops provision
of the lease.
The Utah Supreme Court should have applied a rule of measurement that would have reflected accurately the value of the
injured crops growing on Rust's property and not the decreased
value of the land for agricultural purposes. The- clover, alfalfa,
and natural grasses injured in the instant case were all perennials
used for grazing." For determination of damages to similar perennial crops, an estimate by an expert with special knowledge
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See note 31 supra (clause including damage to land).
551 P.2d at 511 (emphasis added).
Brief of Respondent at 19-20.
See notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
551 P.2d at 511.
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concerning the value of the crops for pasturage has been used.60
The instant case should have been remanded for the taking of
similar testimony of the value of the crops as they stood for grazing separate from the depreciated value of the land as used for
future crop production.

B. Alternative Grounds for Recovery in Tort
Although the award for injury to the 15 acres could not have
been properly justified under the lease provision, grounds for the
award existed in tort. Since the trial court found the location of
the access road to be unreasonable because it interfered with
preexisting irrigation patterns, damages could appropriately have
been awarded in tort for the actual amount that the land had
depreciated in value.61In attempting to justify the award in contract through a tortured definition of growing crops, the Utah
Supreme Court failed to distinguish the two forms of liability and
unnecessarily broadened the scope of contract liability.
Although there was an alternative ground for the award for
the depreciated value of the 15 acres, no basis existed for awarding damages for the entire value of the 5.88 acres taken as a well
site and access road. Since the trial court expressly stated that it
did not find the well site to be unreasonable in its location, use,
or amount of surface taken,62there were no tort grounds upon
which damages could have been based. Damages, if any, would
have to be based upon the growing crops clause of the lease and,
as discussed above,63the only damages allowable would be for the
actual value of the crops then growing on the land. The trial court
did find that the access road was unreasonably located, but not
unreasonable as to the amount of land used.64Although an award
might have been made for the difference in value between the
land actually used for the access road and the land that should
have been used, there was no legal basis for an award for the
entire value of the land.
60. See, e.g., Cities Services Gas Co. v. Christian, 340 P.2d 929, 936 (Okla. 1959).
61. See Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974);
Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 245 Miss. 427, 436, 146 So. 2d 553, 556 (1962) (diminution in value of real property is proper measurement for wrongful injury). A finding of
unreasonable use is sufficient grounds for an award in tort. The plaintiff is not limited to
the conventional theories of negligence, nuisance, or trespass. See note 29 supra.
62. Note 8 supra.
63. See notes 37-42, 54-58 and accompanying text supra.
64. Notes 8 & 50 supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The rules of law that govern the respective rights and duties
of the owners of the surface and mineral estates reflect a carefully
developed balance between two conflicting interests. The rules
attempt to preserve the rights of the mineral owner to the use of
so much of the surface land as is reasonably necessary to the
development of his property. At the same time, however, the
courts have allowed the parties to agree through contract on what
actions will result in liability, and have also imposed liability
when the mineral lessee has acted unreasonably.
Prior to this decision, a surface owner suing under a growing
crops lease provision could recover only for the value of the crops
which were destroyed. The instant case greatly expands the surface owner's rights to include recovery for the depreciation in
value of the land resulting from the lessee's operations. This interpretation is unsupported by prior precedent, and contravenes
the basic rules of construction. Moreover, it was probably unnecessary in this case since the court could have reached the same
result-at least as to the 15 acres-if traditional tort theories had
been correctly applied.

